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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNIONJ 
LOCAL 382, an unincorporated labor 
organization, and CAROLINE 
JOLLEY-CHRISTENSEN, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a 
Utah incorporated special district, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20020764-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Plaintiffs/Appellees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Union") 
believe that the Summary Judgment from which the Defendant/Appellant 
(hereinafter the "UTA") have appealed is not sufficiently ripe for this Court to 
have jurisdiction. The argument for lack of jurisdiction will be discussed below, in 
Point I of the Argument. 
Should the Summary Judgment be appealable, the Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. On November 
5, 2003, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Utah 
Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah 
Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Union is dissatisfied with how the UTA has presented the issues for 
review. The Union does agree, however, with the UTA's statement as to the 
standard of review for the issues. The Union also believes that the UTA did not 
properly preserve Issues "A" and "B" as stated in Brief of Appellant. (See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 1). The only reference to any argument on these two issues before the 
District Court by the UTA was a couple of sentences during oral argument. (T.R. 
17-18). Issue "A" was not ever described in the pleadings filed with the District 
Court or in the Docketing Statement filed with this Court. Therefore, as an 
alternative presentation of the issues for review, the Union presents the following: 
1. Is the Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate appealable pursuant 
to Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated? This issue is a matter of first 
impressions for this Court. It was raised by the Union in a Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction filed pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Since it is a matter involving appellate jurisdiction, there is 
no lower court ruling. 
2. Did the District Court correctly interpret Article 7, Paragraph A of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties? 
3. Is the dispute over the reasons for the employee's termination a 
genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary 
judgment? 
4. Did the Union satisfy the necessary conditions precedent before filing 
its complaint to compel arbitration? 
5. Is the District Court's order compelling arbitration consistent with 
Section 78-3 la-4, Utah Code Annotated? 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 
In addition to Section 78-3 la-4, Utah Code Annotated, referred to in Brief of 
Appellant, the Union believes that Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated, is 
also relevant. That statute reads as follows: 
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law 
for appeals in civil actions from any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff/Appellee Caroline Jolley-Christensen (hereinafter either 
"Christensen" or "employee") was a probationary employee of the 
Defendant/Appellant Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA"). Christensen's 
employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the UTA 
and Plaintiff/Appellee Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 (hereinafter 
"Union"). 
The UTA terminated Christensen's employment. The Union and 
Christensen sought to have the termination reviewed pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement. The UTA refused. Therefore, the Union and Christensen 
filed a complaint with a district court seeking an order to arbitrate against the UTA. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below and Disposition in Court Below 
On December 15,2000, the Union and Christensen filed their complaint to 
compel arbitration with the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. 
(C.R. 1-7). On February 10,2001, the UTA filed its answer generally denying the 
legal premise of the Union's claim. (C.R. 10-15). 
On May 2, 2002, the UTA and the Union filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. (C.R. 17-19,125-126). The motions were fully briefed and oral 
arguments were held on August 20, 2002. (C.R. 225-226). 
Following oral arguments, the Honorable Timothy R. Hansen, Third District 
Court Judge, ruled from the bench, granting the Union's motion for summary 
judgment and denied the UTA's motion for summary judgment. (C.R. 227). The 
court's ruling compelled the parties to arbitrate issues surrounding Christensen's 
termination of employment with the UTA. (C.R. 278-280). The District Court 
entered a Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate, reflecting its ruling, on 
September 5,2002. (C.R. 229-232). A true and correct copy of this Summary 
Judgment is attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum "A". It is from this 
Summary Judgment that the UTA filed its Notice of Appeal on September 19, 
2002. (C.R. 246-251). 
On September 30, 2002, the UTA filed a motion with the District Court to 
stay the arbitration pending appeal. (C.R. 254-255). The motion was fully brief 
and the matter was submitted to the court for decision. The court granted the 
motion and stated its grounds in a minute entry dated January 21,2003. (C.R. 281-
282). An order reflecting the minute entry was entered on February 10, 2003. 
(C.R. 284-285). 
C. Statement of Facts 
On April 28,1999, the Union and the UTA entered into a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement for the term of December 11,1998 through December 10, 
2003 (hereinafter referred to as "CBA"). (A full copy of the CBA is contained in 
the record, C.R. 34-122, and its relevant portions are attached to the Brief of 
Appellant as Addendum "B" and to this Brief as Addendum "A"). The most 
relevant portion of CBA for this case is language which appears in Article 7, 
Paragraph A and reads as follows: 
All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked 
one hundred ten (110) days. During such period, the Authority [UTA] 
is the sole judge of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to 
perform work. This judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or 
arbitration procedure. Otherwise, the Union shall have the right to 
represent the employee. 
(C.R. 36). 
Christensen was a probationary employee with the UTA within the meaning 
of the above quoted paragraph. On July 18, 2000, just prior to completion of her 
probationary period of employment, the UTA terminated her employment. (C.R. 
129). The UTA initially stated no reason for terminating Christensen's 
employment. Notice of Christensen's termination of employment was received by 
the Union on August 17, 2000. By letter dated August 24, 2000, the Union 
requested a review of the termination pursuant to the terms of the CBA. (C.R. 
143). 
By letter dated August 31,2000, the UTA responded to the request of the 
Union for review by stating the following: 
This letter is in response to the request for discipline review, 
received on August 24, concerning Operator Caroline Jolley-Christensen. 
As you know, judgments made by the Authority concerning a 
probationary employees "ability, competency, fitness and 
qualifications to perform work" are not subject to the grievance and 
arbitration procedure (Article 7, CBA). The holding of a discipline 
review in this instance, then, would be contrary to our current collective 
bargaining agreement. 
(C.R. 144). 
The Union subsequently learned that the UTA was then stating that 
"attendance problems" were the reasons for Christensen's termination. By letter 
dated September 1, 2000, the Union responded to the UTA, in part, as follows: 
According to Toby Alires, Civil Rights Compliance Officer, 
Ms. Jolley-Christensen was terminated for "attendance problems." The 
way I see it, Ms. Jolley-Christensen was not terminated because of 
ability, competency, fitness and/or qualifications to perform work, she 
was terminated because of attendance problems. As such, Ms. Jolley-
Christensen falls in to the category of, "Otherwise the Union shall 
have the right to represent the employee" which includes the 
grievance and/or arbitration procedure. 
(C.R. 191-192). 
The Union believed that "attendance problems" must be a pretext for some 
other unspecified reason for termination. There were three reasons for this belief: 
1. In the past, many probationary employees have been retained by the 
UTA even though they had "attendance problems" more severe than Christensen. 
2. On July 7, 2000, Christensen's superior recommended that 
Christensen be granted permanent employment with the UTA. 
3. Under the UTA's internal point system used to evaluate probationary 
employees, Christensen was within standards for permanent employment. 
(C.R. 130,146,233-236). 
The reasons, or lack thereof, for the termination of Christensen's 
employment with the UTA are in dispute between the parties. (C.R. 157-159). 
However, the UTA has been consistent in its position, that it does not matter what 
reasons it had for terminating Christensen's employment, the termination is not 
subject to review under its CBA. (C.R. 161-167). Therefore, it was not surprising 
when the UTA sent to the Union on September 8, 2000 a letter again denying the 
contractual right of Christensen to have her termination of employment reviewed. 
(C.R. 145). 
As a result, the Union and Christensen filed their complaint with the Third 
Judicial District Court. The lower court ruled in favor of the Union and 
Christensen. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal should be dismissed, without prejudice, because the Summary 
Judgment and Order to Arbitrate is not an appealable order within the meaning of 
Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated. 
If the Order to Arbitrate is appealable, this Court should affirm the Summary 
Judgment since the District Court correctly held that Article 7, Paragraph A of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement was clear and unambiguous and requires 
the disputed facts surrounding the termination of Christensen's employment to be 
arbitrated. The dispute as to the reasons for Christensen's termination is one of the 
grounds for granting summary judgment. 
Further, the Union complied with the relevant requirements of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement before the Union field the complaint to compel 
arbitration against the UTA. Finally, the District Court's Order to Arbitrate is 
consistent with the requirements of Section 78-3 la-4, Utah Code Annotated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ORDER TO ARBITRATE IS NOT APPEALABLE 
PURSUANT TO U.C.A § 78-31a-19. 
Whether an order to compel arbitration, which otherwise may be a final 
order, is appealable pursuant to Section 78-3 la-19, Utah Code Annotated, prior to 
the parties arbitrating their dispute, is an issue of first impression with the Utah 
courts. Although it is one of the first impressions, it is a subject that has been 
litigated a great deal around the nation. In fact, there is an excellent annotation of 
the cases on this subject entitled "Appealability of State Court's Order or Decree 
compelling or Refusing to Compel Arbitration" by David B. Harrison, J.D., 6 
A.L.R. 4th 652. 
As a general rule, appellate courts seem to hold that orders compelling 
arbitration are not final orders from which an appeal may be taken. However, in 
the case at hand, the Union would have to agree with the statement made by the 
UTA in its Docketing Statement, p.2, that the subject order compelling arbitration 
is a final order. 
The reason for the Union's view that the subject Order to Arbitrate is a final 
order is because the Union was granted by the District Court full relief and no 
issues remain unresolved with the District Court. Further, often orders to compel 
arbitration are accompanied with an order staying further court proceedings, until 
such time as the arbitrator rules. In the case at hand, there were no collary court 
proceedings to stay. Thus, the Union believes that the best view is that the subject 
Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate was a final order. 
The traditional view is that an aggrieved party has the right to appeal to the 
appropriate appellate court any adverse final judgment. However, a sensitive 
reading of the law demonstrates that such a right to appeal is not absolute. 
The starting point for determining whether or not the UTA has a right to 
appeal the adverse ruling of the District Court is, of course, Rule 3(a), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
An appeal may be taken from the district or juvenile court to 
the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders 
and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice 
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by 
Rule 4. [Emphasis added]. 
The very wording of Rule 3(a) clearly notes that the law may provide that 
some final orders are not appealable as a matter of right. For example, in criminal 
in 
cases, the state does not have a right to appeal acquittals. See State v. Chugg, 749 
p. 2d 1279 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). In small claims cases, final judgments following a 
trial de novo are only subject to limited rights to appeal. Section 78-6-10(2), Utah 
Code Annotated. It is the Union's view that the Utah legislature has limited the 
right of the UTA to appeal an order to compel arbitration. 
In the present case, the enforceability of the arbitration clause contained in 
the CBA is covered by the Utah Arbitration Act; Sections 78-3 la-1, et. seq., Utah 
Code Annotated. That act contains a set of procedures for obtaining a court 
interpretation of arbitration clauses, including the appeal rights of the parties bound 
by those interpretations. Section 78-3la-19, Utah Code Annotated, reads in its 
entirety, as follows: 
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law 
for appeals in civil actions from any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration. 
The above quoted statute must be the basis for any appeal sought by the 
UTA herein. However, the state legislature specifically excluded from the 
enumerated appealable orders, an order "granting a motion to compel arbitration." 
It must be presumed by the courts that such legislative exclusion was intentional. 
In a recent decision, this Court hinted at why the Utah legislature may have 
deliberately excluded certain orders under the Utah Arbitration Act from the right 
to appeal. In Cade v. Zions First National Bank, 956 P. 2d 1073 (Utah App 1998), 
a former employee of the bank filed a complaint in District Court alleging that he 
was wrongfully discharged from his employment with the bank. The bank filed a 
motion to compel arbitration with the Court pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act. 
The Court granted the bank's motion and the parties went to binding arbitration. 
Following a favorable ruling from the arbitrator, the bank file a motion with the 
District Court to confirm the arbitration awarded. The Court confirmed the award 
and the employee appealed pursuant to the above quoted Section 78-3la-19(3), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
On appeal, the employee challenged the trial court's initial granting of the 
order to arbitrate, just as the UTA is now challenging the District Court's order. 
The bank responded to that challenge by arguing that the employee had waived his 
right to appeal the order compelling arbitration when he failed to immediately 
appeal that order at the time the order had been granted. This Court rejected the 
bank's argument by stating: 
Utah courts have not yet addressed the legal standard that courts must 
apply to determine whether a party has waived its right to challenge an 
arbitration order or award. However, we cannot agree that Cade's decision 
to withhold further challenge until after the arbitration proceeding 
constituted a waiver of his right to do so. 
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Courts from other jurisdictions have repeatedly held that orders 
compelling arbitration and staying the underlying action are not final orders 
and thus are not immediately appealable. See Wiepking v. Prudential-Bache 
Sec.,Inc., 940 F.2d 996, 999 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Plaintiffs did not waive their 
right to appeal the district court's order simply because they did what the 
court ordered them to do."); Jolley v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 
867 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1989); Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 116 
F.2d 888,890 (10th Circ. 1985). 
Such a conclusion is consistent with Utah's "long-standing public 
policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicated disputes." 
Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996) 
(citation omitted). "One hesitates to contemplate the avalanche of motions 
for discretionary review that would burden the courts if parties were required 
to seek this relief from clearly interlocutory orders to forfeit their right to 
appeal the matter when the litigation is concluded." Wiepking, 940 F.2d at 
1000. 
956P.2datl080. 
The Utah legislature has recently revisited the Utah Arbitration Act with 
several significant amendments. Effect May 15, 2003, Section 78-3la-129, Utah 
Code Annotated, which will replace Section 78-3la-19, reads as follows: 
(1) An appeal may be taken from: 
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; 
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award; 
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or 
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter. 
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a 
judgment in a civil action. [Emphasis added]. 
If the parties' had a new CBA, it is obvious that the Utah legislature would 
permit the UTA to take the type of appeal which the UTA now seeks. The 
legislature by their act of amending the statute have demonstrated their belief that 
the Utah Arbitration Act, covering the current CBA, does not permit the UTA to 
appeal the present Summary Judgment and Order to Arbitrate. 
Just because the UTA does not have the right to appeal the current Order to 
Arbitrate, it does not mean the order is not subject to appellate review. The UTA 
could seek a review pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such 
a request by the UTA might be problematic because the current Order to Arbitrate 
is not an interlocutory order. However, the same policy discussions normally 
involved whether or not this Court should grant an interlocutory appeal would be 
extremely relevant in any discretionary appeal right the UTA may currently have. 
Additionally, the UTA could clearly seek a review of the order in the same 
manner that the Zion's Bank employee did in the above cited Cade case. After an 
arbitration hearing and ruling in the case at hand, the UTA could appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court following a District Court order either confirming, denying, 
or modifying the arbitration decision. The Cade case clearly holds that such an 
appellate review is appropriate. 
A central argument of the UTA on this issue is that, regardless of the 
wording of Sections 78-31 a-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated; Section 5 of Article 
VIII of the Utah Constitution guarantees UTA's right of appeal in the case at hand. 
(See Utah Transit Authority's Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to 
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Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction, dated November 2,2002, filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court). However, it is the Union's view that UTA is misapplying 
the Utah Constitution. 
First, and most importantly, the Union believes that the UTA does have the 
right to appeal the ruling of the District Court. However, the right of the UTA to 
appeal has yet to ripen. As described above, the UTA would have an absolute right 
to appeal only after the ordered arbitration has been concluded. Such a view would 
be consistent with the "long-standing public policy" of encouraging parties to 
arbitrate their disputes; rather than litigate in Court. Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake 
Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah, 1996). Therefore, should this Court accept the 
Union's interpretation of Section 78-3 la-19, that interpreted would be consistent 
with the UTA's interpretation of the Utah Constitution. 
Second, Section 5 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution is not an absolute 
grant of a right to appeal in all cases. Past case law interpreting that section, or its 
predecessors, enumerated a number of appropriate limitations on the right of 
appeal. For example, in State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah, 1977), the Court 
reaffirmed the view that, in spite of the wording contained in the Utah 
Constitution, the state does not have the right to appeal certain adverse sentences in 
criminal cases. The Court specifically held that the right of appeal could be limited 
by statute. 
In Kanab v. Gushev, 965 P.2d 1065 (Utah Crt App. 1998) this Court held 
that this Court may limit the constitutional right of appeal by court promulgated 
rules pursuant to its authority granted under Section 4 of Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, the limitation on appeals as argued by the Union and as 
established in Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, are perfectly 
constitutional. 
Since the constitutional right of appeal can be limited (not eliminated) by 
both legislative statute or court rule, dismissing the UTA's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction does not violate Section 5 of Article VII of the Utah Constitution. 
The UTA also argues that Section 78-2-2(3), Utah Code Annotated, 
mandates an appeal right. This is incorrect. That statute holds that, if there is an 
appeal, then the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction. And, the Union concurs 
that, if there is to be an appeal in this matter, the Utah Supreme Court would have 
had jurisdiction. 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, reads in its entirety as follows: 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over.. .orders, judgments and 
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction... [Emphasis added] 
Clearly, that statue is a grant of appellate jurisdiction over both appeals by right 
and appeals by discretion of the court. The purpose of the statute is to designate an 
appellate court, not to grant a right of appeal. 
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This Court should dismiss this appeal, without prejudice, and permit the 
parties to proceed with the ordered arbitration. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED ARTICLE 
7, PARAGRAPH A OF THE CBA. 
The gravaman of this case has been the different legal interpretations of 
Article 7, Paragraph A of the CBA. The UTA has consistently argued that the 
clear, unambiguous language of that paragraph grants to the UTA absolute 
discretion in whether or not to terminate the employment of any of its probationary 
employees. (See Point IV of UTA's argument in its Brief of Appellant, pp 23-29). 
The Union has consistently argued that, although the language of the CBA grants 
broad discretion to the UTA, the clear, unambiguous language of the subject 
paragraph does not grant the UTA absolute discretion in terminating probationary 
employees. That discretion of the UTA is limited to the probationary employee's 
"work performance". (C.R. 201). 
Both parties agree that the language of the CBA must be the starting point 
for any analysis. Again, the critical language reads as follows: 
All new employees shall be on probation until they have worked one 
hundred ten (110) days. During such period, the Authority [UTA] is the sole 
judge of ability, competency, fitness and qualifications to perform work. 
This judgment shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration procedure. 
Otherwise, the Union shall have the right to represent the employee. 
In its analysis of that paragraph, the UTA emphasizes the phrases "the 
Authority [UTA] is the sole judge" and "This judgment shall not be subject to the 
grievance or arbitration procedure." In the Union's analysis of that same 
paragraph, the Union emphasizes "to perform work" and "Otherwise, the Union 
shall have the right to represent the employee." 
The parties also agree on the law of contract language interpretation. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in a recent case set forth that law clearly when it stated: 
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. 
Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, If 13, 987 P.2d 48 (quotation 
omitted). "[W]e first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine 
the intentions of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); see <Aso Reed v. Davis Co. Sch. Dist, 892 
P.2d 1063, 1064-1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). If the language within the four 
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are 
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at f 14, 
987 P.2d 48 (citing WillardPease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995)). If the language within the four corners of 
the contract is ambiguous, however, extrinsic evidence must be looked to in 
order to determine the intentions of the parties. Id. In evaluating whether 
the plain language is ambiguous, we attempt to harmonize all of the 
contract's provisions and all of its terms. Id.; see also Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). "An ambiguity exists where 
the language 'is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one 
sense.'" Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at f 14, 987 P.2d 48 (quoting R&R Energies v. 
Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Utah 1997) (further 
quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we first look to the plain language within 
the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties... 
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Park West Assocs., 40 P.3d 599,605 (Utah 
2002). 
The Union had argued before the District Court that harmonizing the 
different emphasis of the contract language by the two parties was properly the role 
of a labor arbitrator. (See Reply memorandum in Support of Union's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment. C.R. 215-221). The District Court rejected that argument and 
ruled that Article 7, Paragraph A of the CBA was unambiguous and that the 
Union's interpretation was correct. (TR. 43-46). 
The Union interpreted the subject paragraph to mean that, should the UTA 
terminate a probationary employee for non-work performance reasons, that 
termination is reviewable and grievable. This interpretation is consistent and in 
harmony with all the words of the subject paragraph. The UTA's interpretation of 
the same paragraph requires the elimination of several words from the CBA. This 
is admitted in footnote 4 on page 27 of Brief of Appellant, which reads as follows: 
For the same reasons, the Trial Court's focus on the phrase "to 
perform work" in the second sentence is unreasonable. Surely, the 
contracting parties did not carefully script the second sentence to grant 
extensive discretion to UTA regarding probationary employees, only to see 
that discretion so easily quashed by conjecture that UTA's judgment was not 
based on work performance. Instead, it is far more reasonable to conclude 
that the parties intended to exclude all probationary employee terminations 
from review, rather than carve out an exception that swallows the rule. 
Under the case law, cited by both parties, it is inappropriate for the courts to ignore 
language specifically written into a contract. 
The UTA, now on appeal, seems to recognize its analytical problem by 
arguing that, since there are two reasonable alternative interpretations of Article 7, 
Paragraph A of the CBA, there must be an ambiguity in the CBA that prevents the 
granting of summary judgment. (See Brief of Appellant, pp. 30-31). 
There are several problems with the UTA's argument. First, it is a complete 
departure from anything they have argued before the District Court. The UTA 
presented no factual evidence as to any parties' intent in the drafting of the 
language of Article 7, Paragraph A other than the language itself. Second, the 
UTA's "reasonable alternative interpretation" still requires this Court to ignore 
specific language of the CBA. In all of the argument, it cannot be denied that the 
phrase "ability, competency, fitness and qualification to perform work", although 
broad, is not all encompassing. The UTA's broad discretion over terminating 
probationary employees is specifically limited by the language of the parties' 
agreement. Finally, if there is an ambiguity in the CBA, that ambiguity should be 
resolved by a labor arbitrator. As stated above, the Union specifically argued this 
point before the District Court. 
The District Court appropriately held that the only way the harmonize all the 
language of Article 7, Paragraph A, was to adopt the Union's interpretation of that 
clause. The Union presented the only unambiguous, clear interpretation. The 
District Court's interpretation should be affirmed. 
POINT III: DISPUTE OVER THE REASONS FOR TERMINATING THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF CHRISTENSEN IS NOT GROUNDS FOR 
DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Union presented evidence to the District Court why it believed the 
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Stated grounds for Christensen's termination was a pretext. The UTA has never 
stated any reason for Christensen's termination other than "attendance problems". 
The UTA strongly disagrees with the Union's factual representation. Obviously, 
there is a classic factual dispute. 
The UTA argues that such a factual dispute precludes the granting of 
summary judgment. (See Brief of Appellant pp 18-23). However, the UTA has 
the argument exactly backwards. The existence of this dispute is why there must 
be an order to compel arbitration; an arbitrator must resolve this factual dispute. 
If the UTA were successful with this argument, it would mean that the 
Union would have to litigate the factual basis of the pretextual dismissal twice. 
First, the Union would have to interview and obtain testimony from all the 
witnesses and present that evidence to the District Court. The Union would then 
have to convince the District Court that the weight of all the evidence was that the 
employee was terminated for non-work performance reasons. Such an argument 
would probably require a trial. Second, if the Union was successful at trial before 
the District Court, the Union would have to retry the case before an arbitrator, so 
an arbitrator can impose appropriate remedies under the CBA. 
The whole public policy behind encouraging parties to arbitrate their 
disputes is to avoid the expense and duplicative efforts which would be the result 
of adoption of the UTA's argument. Although federal law is not controlling in this 
matter, there is a great deal of federal case law discussing the value of encouraging 
labor arbitration. In federal labor law, the guidelines for requiring arbitration are 
described as follows: 
(1) a party cannot be forced to arbitrate any dispute that it has not 
obligated itself by contract to submit to arbitration; (2) unless the parties 
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, whether a collective bargaining 
agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate a particular grievance is 
an issue for judicial determination; (3) in making this determination, a court 
is not to consider the merits of the underlying claim; and (4) where the 
agreement contains an arbitration clause, the court should apply a 
presumption of arbitrability, resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration, and 
should not deny an order to arbitrate "unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute." Moreover, in cases involving broad 
arbitration clauses the Court has found the presumption of arbitrability 
"particularly applicable," and only an express provision excluding a 
particular grievance from arbitration or "the most forceful evidence of a 
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail." 
United Steelworks v. Mead Corp. 21 F.3d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1994). 
It is interesting that not once in the UTA's argument does it speak to the 
virtues and values behind encouraging labor arbitration. The UTA seems to want 
all the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement, but none of the 
responsibilities imposed by a broad arbitration clause. 
This Court should reject the UTA's argument that the Union must litigate 
the factual basis of Christensen's claim twice. 
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POINT IV: THE UNION SATISFIED THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
PRIOR TO FILING ITS COMPLAINT. 
The UTA is now arguing that the Union did not file the appropriate 
"grievance" under the CBA in order for the District Court to have jurisdiction to 
order arbitration. Although this was a mere side argument before the lower court, 
the UTA has elevated this argument to Point I of its Brief. (See Brief of Appellant, 
pp9-17). 
The procedures for review of employee discipline, including termination of 
employment, are spelled out in Articles 12 and 13 of the CBA. Partial copies of 
these articles are attached to the UTA's Brief. (See Brief of Appellant, Appendix 
"B"). A complete copy is attached to this Brief as Exhibit "A". Article 12 
provides that the Union and the aggrieved employee must within eleven (11) days 
of receiving notice of the termination, file a "request for review" with the UTA's 
Human Resources Department. There is no dispute between the parties that 
Christensen and the Union complied with this requirement with its letter dated 
August 24, 2000. 
The UTA responded with a letter stating quite clearly that Christensen's 
termination is not "reviewable" under the CBA. The exact words of the letter 
were,".. .judgment made by its Authority [UTA] concerning a probationary 
employee's 'ability, competency, fitness, and qualifications to perform work' are 
not subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures..." [Emphasis added], A 
week later, and after a written rebuttal from the Union, the UTA again by letter 
stated that Christensen's termination was not "subject to the grievance process." 
(C.R. 144-145). 
The UTA now argues that it was necessary for the Union to go through the 
futile gesture of filing grievances and requests for arbitration with the UTA, after 
the UTA had already, twice in writing, stated that the dispute was not subject to the 
grievance and arbitration processes of the parties' CBA. It is traditional labor law 
that the courts will not require the parties to go through meaningless actions before 
seeking relief from the courts. This is consistent with traditional contract law 
which also governs arbitration agreements. Hansen v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79 
(2002). If the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have repudiated the 
established grievance procedure, an aggrieved party may seek court relief. United 
Food and Commercial Works v. Safeway Stores, 889 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.1989). If 
the grievance process would be wholly futile, the parties to an agreement may seek 
judicial relief. Ritza v. International Longshoremen, 837 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Also, if the grievance process is too hostile, inadequate to provide sufficient relief, 
or likely to delay opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits, the parties 
to an agreement may seek court relief without going through the meaningless steps 
of the grievance process. Clayton v. International Union, 451 U.S. 679 (1981). 
It was absolutely clear by the UTA's response to the Union's request to 
review Christensen's termination that any further use of the grievance and 
arbitration process of the parties' CBA would be a futile waste of time. This is a 
classic exception to the traditional need to exhaust contractual procedures prior to 
seeking judicial relief. 
The irony of the UTA's argument is that the desired relief requested by the 
Union is to proceed with the contractual processes. This Court should affirm the 
order to compel arbitration. 
POINT V: THE ORDER TO ARBITRATE COMPLIES WITH U.C.A. § 78-3 la-
4(i). 
Section 78-31a-4(i), Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows: 
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is 
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope 
of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those 
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. [Emphasis added]. 
Clearly, the scope of the matters covered by the arbitration clause of the CBA has 
been the central debate between the Union and the UTA. The District Court 
resolved this dispute by bifurcating the factual disputes of the parties into two 
separate questions for an arbitrator. First, the arbitrator would decide the factual 
issues surrounding why Christensen was terminated. Second, should the arbitrator 
determine that Christensen was terminated for non-work performance reasons, the 
arbitrator would decide the appropriate contracted remedies for resolving 
Christensen's termination. It is clear from the UTA's Brief that it objects to the 
District Court's bifurcation of the arbitrator's role. (See Brief of Appellant, pp 17-
18). However, counsel for the Union is not clear on the reasons for the UTA's 
objection. (This matter was not argued before the District Court). 
It appears that the UTA is objecting to the Order to Arbitrate because it 
requires the arbitrator to determine whether or not he has jurisdiction to arbitrate. 
This concept is often called the "arbitration of arbitrability". The problem with the 
UTA's objection is that, whether or not Christensen's termination is reviewable, 
turns on the factual nature of her termination. That factual finding must be done 
by an arbitrator. 
It is the Union's reading of the Utah Arbitration Act that the District Court 
did exactly what was required under the above quoted language of the Act to 
properly focus the arbitration on what was at issue, the termination of 
Christensen's employment by the UTA. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the District Court's Summary Judgment and Order 
to Arbitrate and permit the parties to arbitrate their dispute. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 2004. 
Joseph E. Hatch 
Attorney for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
Articles 11, 12, 13,14, and 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
between Utah Transit Authority and Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 
382. 
4 
t^STro^  discharged-for other roagons, shall be granted a leave of absence.* 
l 
3 ARTICLE 11 NOTICE OF DISCIPLINE 
4 Employees shall be advised of any discipline or charges within eleven (11) calendar days 
5 after the General Manager of the Authority or its designees have knowledge of any alleged 
6 violation of Authority rules or other offenses. Oral warnings may be given, or the employee shall 
7 be furnished a written statement of the offense or discipline. The written statement shall include 
8 a description of the actions or behavior in which the employee is alleged to have engaged. Such 
9 statement shall be sufficiently precise and complete so that the employee may be able to identify 
10 the actions or behavior to which reference is made. For the purposes of this Article, persons who 
11 have been retained to monitor service and performance shall be deemed designees of the General 
"* 2 Manager. Also, with respect to discipline for chargeable accidents, the time period under this 
13 Article shall commence to run when the Accident Review Committee's report is received and 
14 time-stamped in the Risk Management Department of the Authority. A copy of the time-stamped 
15 report shall be furnished to the Union. 
16 
17 ARTICLE 12: SUSPENSION OR DISCHARGE 
18 A prompt review shall be made in any situation where discharge or other discipline is 
19 contemplated or has been administered, provided request for such review is made in writing to 
20 the Human Resources Department within eleven (II) calendar days following notice by the 
2 1 Authority to the Union that discharge or discipline may be involved. If no request is made to the 
22 Authority within that time, and the discharge or discipline is administered by the Authority, such 
7 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
mehean„gis held and a decision is rendered. 
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 attached hereto. 
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with or without back pay as deemed justified by the facts and evidence. 
If either party fails to meet the above time limits, the other party may automatically move 
the matter to the next step in the procedure or arbitration. If a matter is not appealed by the 
Union to the next step in a timely manner, it shall be deemed resolved on the basis of the last 
answer; provided, however, that if the Authority fails to meet any of the time deadlines and the 
Union carries the matter to the next step, the Authority shall pay to the Union a penalty of S400. 
ARTICLED: PROCEDURE FOR GRIEVANCES 
The term "grievance", shall mean a complaint and/or dispute by the Union and/or 
3 employee concerning the proper interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement. 
1 FIRST STEP: All grievances should first be discussed with the immediate 
2 supervisor who should be advised of the particular section of the agreement that is involved. The 
3 Union and the Authority agree that it is in the best interest of all parties to settle the dispute at 
this stage. If not resolved in that discussion, or if other circumstances warrant, the Union or the 
employee may fill out a grievance form provided by the Authority. The grievance form must be 
submitted in 'writing to the Human Resources Department within eleven (11) calendar days after 
the incident giving rise to the grievance is known to exist. Grievances in the Mount Ogden and 
Timpanogos Divisions may be filed with the Operations Division Manager's office. 
STEP TWO: Within seven (7) calendar days following the filing of a grievance, 
the Human Resources Department will investigate the facts and evidence giving rise to the 
> l grievance and shall give to the Union a written answer to the grievance. 
>
 2 STEP THREE: If the grievance is not satisfactorily resolved by the Step Two-
1 answer, or if the answer is not provided within the time allowed, the Union may appeal the matter 
2 to Step Three within seven (7) calendar days by filing a written appeal with the Human 
3 Resources Department. At Step Three, the matter shall be submitted to the GRC which shall 
4 attempt to settle the matter by using the Collaborative process. 
5 STEP FOUR: If the matter is not settled by the GRC within twenty-one (21) 
6 days after the Step Two answer, the Union may recuest arbitration under Article 14, provided 
7 such request is made within twenty-eight (28) calendar days after the Step Two answer. The 
8 selected arbitrator shall review the same facts and evidence as were presented before the GRC 
9 together with any new facts and evidence subsequently discovered and promptly brought to the 
10 attention of the other party and shall then either sustain, modify or rescind that decision as 
11 deemed justified by the facts and evidence. 
12 If the Authority fails to meet any of the above time limits prior to the appeal for 
13 arbitration, the Union may automatically move the matter to the next step of the grievance 
14 procedure; provided, that if the Union moves the matter to the next step, the Authority shall also 
1 5 pay the Union a penalty of S400. 
1 6 
17 ARTICLE 14: A R B I T R A T I O N P R O C E D U R E S 
L8 Only grievances which have been timely processed by the Union through the grievance 
L9 steps in Article 12 or 13 and which allege a violation of this Agreement (including a claim alleging 
10 unjust suspension or termination) may be carried to arbitration. Reasonable extensions to the 
1 time limits set forth in Articles 12 through 14 shall be granted upon advance request by either 
2 party. 
10 
All reasonable efforts should be made to avoid the expense and trouble of arbitration. 
Within thirty-five (35) calendar days of request for arbitration, the parties shall either agree upon 
3 an arbitrator or shall give notice of selection to the arbitrator who is next in order on the 
4 expedited list of arbitrators existing as of the date of this Agreement. During the term of this 
5 Agreement, either party may exercise one peremptory challenge to any arbitrator on the expedited 
6 panel. If an arbitrator is removed by such challenge or by mutual agreement, a replacement shall 
7 be selected by requesting a panel of names from the Federal Mediation Service. Seven (7) 
8 calendar days after receipt of such panel the parties shall select the replacement arbitrator by 
9 alternately striking names from the panel with the first strike determined by lot. Extensions of up 
.0 to seven (7) calendar days may be granted for either party if written or verbal request is made 
LI within forty-eight (48) hours of the original deadline. If the Union fails timely to select an 
{
 2 arbitrator, the grievance shall be deemed withdrawn. 
3 Both, parties shall reduce to writing their agreed positions with respect to facts, evidence, 
14 and issues, and any disputed facts, evidence or issues. In discipline or discharge cases, no 
15 transcripts or post-hearing briefs shall be used unless requested by the Union, and the decision 
16 of the arbitrator shall be rendered within five (5) calendar days. In other cases, transcripts and 
17 post-hearing briefs may be omitted by mutual agreement, and a time limit for decision may be set 
18 by mutual agreement 
19 The arbitrator shall have no power to change this Agreement nor to impose any terms or 
2 0 conditions the arbitrator might think the parties should have agreed upon. The arbitrator's power 
2 1 is limited to finding the facts and to applying the terms of this Agreement to those facts. The 
22 Union and the Authority shall equally share the expense and charges of the arbitrator. The 
11 
<ji me arbitrator shall be final and binding upon all parties. 
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ARTICLE 15: LEAVES O K A B S E N C E 
A. Leaves of absence without pay or fringe benefits shall be granted for gooel and 
sufficient reasons for periods of up to ninety (90) days. All leaves of absence must be approved 
in writing before commencing such leave. The Authority may refuse to grant leaves/of absence 
for good ca\ise, but will not arbitrarily refuse leaves. Leaves longer than ninety 00) days must 
be approved dy both the Authority and the Union, except for military leave, which shall be 
granted in accordance with applicable laws. 
B. Employees elected or appointed to full-time Union off/ce shall be granted leave 
of absence. 
C. Employees returning from leaves of absence/shall return to their original 
classification and may exercise seniority to take the least senior shift or regular run but otherwise 
shall bid for assignment on the nexrvregular change or bid day. Time on leave is not considered 
time worked for any purpose except seniority, which continues to accumulate during leaves of 
less than ninety (90) days, military leaves oiSleaves longer than ninety (90) days as approved by 
both parties, essentially for long term illness/ 
D. Employees who are eligible for anckhave enrolled in the medical insurance 
program, and who take a leave of absence from the AuthVity, and who waive benefit coverage 
while on a leave, will be reinstated to the insurance program on the first day of the month 
following their return to worfc provided they have given the Authority at least 30 days' advance 
notice of their return from leave of absence and they actually return, on the specified day. 
